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Abstract: 
This article investigates the work conducted by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the 
development of tactical air power in the inter-war period. It analyses the RAF’s theoretical 
doctrinal thinking during the period along with exercises conducted on a joint Service basis to 
further develop these ideas in practice. It will argue that, rather than neglecting tactical air 
power during this period as is the accepted view, much good theoretical work was done that 
formed a theoretical and intellectual basis for the further development of tactical air power in 
the light of operational experience during the Second World War. 
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The Royal Air Force (RAF) ended the First World War fully versed in all aspects of tactical 
air power and proficient in its application given the relative technological limitations 
particularly in communications in 1918. The RAF was able to conduct close air support, 
battlefield air interdiction, artillery observation and tactical and strategic reconnaissance in 
support of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).2 It has been argued that with the end of the 
First World War the development of tactical air power in Britain effectively stopped and the 
doctrine that was utilised during the Battle of France, 1940, suffered to a great extent.3 This 
article will challenge this argument and demonstrate the degree to which tactical air power 
developed in Britain in the inter-war period.  
The use of tactical air power was fundamental to the success of land armies in the Second 
World War. This was particularly the case for the British Army in the Western Desert where 
much time and effort was used to develop a functioning, impromptu air support system. This 
was achieved in the face of tremendous enemy opposition and required the Western Desert 
Air Force and Eighth Army to forgo the inter-Service rivalry that typified this development in 
Britain. They had to work closely together in order to implement some of the ideas that had 
emerged from the First World War and were further highlighted in the exercises conducted 
during the inter-war period.4 These included the co-location of headquarters, the importance 
of maintaining experienced pilots within army co-operation squadrons and the utilisation of 
liaison officers at army/RAF forward headquarters. These concepts are the bedrock for 
effective tactical air power, and the developments made during the inter-war period provided 
the theoretical and intellectual basis for its continued advancement during the Second World 
War.  With the increasing development of both aircraft and communications technology, the 
concepts that emerged from the First World War would require trialling in the inter-war 
period to demonstrate their continued importance. The focus of the inter-war period for the 
RAF, however, was the theoretical development of strategic bombing.5 
It was believed that the development of a strategic bombing force would secure the continued 
independence of the RAF, would give the British Isles greater security from potential 
European aggressors and end any major European conflict quickly through the targeting of 
the enemy’s homeland, government infrastructure and people. This article will argue that, 
whilst it was never high on the RAF’s list of priorities, it did seek to develop tactical air 
power during the inter-war period and to a greater extent than has been acknowledged in the 
literature. David Hall, for example, has claimed that, with the disbanding of the Experimental 
Armoured Force in 1928, there were no more opportunities for tactical level development of 
air support.6 It has also been claimed that during the inter-war period the RAF simply forgot 
how to support the army.7 This article will demonstrate that the RAF did not simply forget 
how to support the army, but due to the atmosphere of the inter-war period felt unable to push 
this aspect of air power to any great degree.8 Many of the ideas from the exercises conducted 
would go on to be utilised to great effect during the Second World War. These exercises 
demonstrate that the RAF was indeed thinking about the theoretical application of tactical air 
power thinking during the inter-war period. This argument will be supported through an 
analysis of the army co-operation exercises conducted between 1927 and 1933. The years in 
which these exercises took place is also instructive to the wider development of military force 
within Britain. These exercises took place prior to the introduction of rearmament in Britain, 
where each Service looked to present its own case for expansion and reduced the good will 
necessary for collaboration and co-operation in joint matters. It will also look at the wider 
inter-Service political structure and financial limitations within which the RAF was working 
in the inter-war period. 
It will finish by demonstrating some of the effects of the stunted development of tactical air 
power in Britain through a short analysis of the Battle of France from an air perspective. It 
must be accepted that, despite the developments that had been made during the inter-war 
period in tactical air power, the RAF was not ready for the challenge that awaited it in 
France.9 This is more down to the inter-Service rivalry that pervaded the inter-war period and 
prevented greater development than any failing on the exercises or thinking of the period. 
Whilst already widely studied, the inter-Service rivalry during the inter-war period is vital to 
gain an understanding of the atmosphere in which the army co-operation exercises were 
conducted and the position the RAF found itself in when trying to discuss and debate these 
ideas with the General Staff.10 Even though there was plenty of discussion on this issue, little 
fruitful debate could take place as neither side was willing to back down from what they 
believed to be the correct application of tactical air power. These developments in the 
principles that would guide effective tactical air power were undertaken by the RAF in 
isolation as there was little prospect of both Services reaching agreement on a joint doctrine.   
The major focus of post-Second World War air power history has been on the development 
and application of strategic air power. Tactical air power was lost in the wilderness and has 
only recently come to the fore. This recent focus has come about due to historians re-
engaging with the land battles of the Second World War and looking to develop a wider 
understanding of how success was gained in the land operations. Alongside this re-
engagement with the land battles of the Second World War, the importance of tactical air 
power to these campaigns has also emerged. This wider examination has led to the study of 
the support given from the air and how the systems that were employed were developed. 
Through doing this, however, the context of tactical air power development by the RAF is 
lost. This focus of the RAF on strategic bombing can be cogently explained by the geo-
political situation that influenced British defence policy. In a comparison with the German 
geo-political situation, Williamson Murray has highlighted how its geographical position has 
influenced British thinking on warfare: 
The British living on an island and possessing the largest navy in Europe, could 
afford to think in terms of strategic bombing … German strategic problems 
however, were the exact opposite. Germany was not an island power; she was a 
continental power in any conceivable conflict that would involve the military 
forces of the German Reich, Germany would face the probability of land 
operations at the outset of hostilities.11 
This meant that the British could afford to develop an air power capability and doctrine 
centred around strategic bombing, as they would, in theory, have the luxury of time for this 
and economic warfare policies to take effect. If Germany, on the other hand, were to develop 
such thinking, they may find themselves decisively defeated on land before the effects of 
strategic bombing could make themselves felt. The focus of historians such as Noble 
Frankland, Charles Webster, Robin Neillands and Peter Gray has, quite naturally, been on the 
destruction and devastation caused by strategic bombing and the advent of airborne nuclear 
weaponry.12 Due to this focus, it is easy to look glibly on whatever developments were made 
by the RAF in Britain in the field of tactical air power during the inter-war period and to 
dismiss them. 
The First World War had laid an effective platform for the future development of tactical air 
power in Britain, but this was not built upon as greatly as it could have been. The RAF’s 
army co-operation capabilities in 1918 were unrecognisable from that of the Royal Flying 
Corps (RFC) of 1914. Army co-operation in 1914 was limited to strategic reconnaissance 
and, due to doubts surrounding the possible accuracy of information gained from pilots flying 
quickly across the battlefield, pilots initially had to prove their worth to ground forces; that is 
not to say that the British Army of 1914 was against the use of aircraft. Officers such as 
General Sir Douglas Haig had taken a great deal interest in how aircraft could enhance the 
strategic vision of senior commanders prior to 1914.13 As with any new technology, however, 
its usefulness would only become truly clear when it had proved itself in the heat of battle. As 
the mobility that characterised the opening of the First World War was replaced by the static 
trench warfare, army co-operation came into its own. By 1917 the RFC had developed an 
effective system through wireless telegraphy to conduct artillery observation.14 The RFC 
were also able to conduct close air support and battlefield air interdiction missions in support 
of offensives to great effect.15 These missions were pre-planned as the communications 
technology of the time did not allow for troops to call for impromptu support through 
wireless or radio telegraphy. Other methods for aircraft to locate ground forces whilst 
conducting support, such as signal lights fired by infantry were used, but their success was 
haphazard.16 Experience such as this would prove invaluable for the continued development 
of tactical air power in the inter-war period. The First World War was the testing ground for 
many different ideas and from this experimentation, as with all of air power in the First 
World War, sound systems and concepts that worked with the technology available.17 The 
apparent stall in the development of tactical air power in Britain after 1918 was due to the 
financial, political and strategic situation that was faced by all three Services as well as the 
RAF’s focus on the application of air power at the strategic level of war.  
Whilst the RAF were working in close co-operation with the army in the Empire between 
1919 and 1939, any major development in this field was not seen by the Air Ministry as 
applicable to any potential major European conflict involving a first-class enemy.18 Focusing 
on strategic bombing also had further advantages for the newly formed RAF in the years after 
the First World War. It allowed them to demonstrate a new, theoretical, way of fighting wars 
against major European powers that could foreshorten any conflict by attacking an enemy 
nation’s industrial and political infrastructure.19 This potential type of warfare could not be 
pursued by an air force that was tied to land and naval Services. The Air Staff theorised that 
any other European nation developing air power in this way could place London in grave 
danger due to its relative proximity to the continent.20 
By pursuing the development of strategic air power, and arguably exaggerating the impact of 
strategic air attack on Britain, the RAF was looking to preserve its independent status.21 The 
RAF’s independence, as well as the limited defence budgets, which now had to be split three 
ways, brought the RAF into direct conflict with its sister Services the army and Royal Navy. 
Both of these Services believed that the RAF should be disbanded, and its resources brought 
back under their control as had been the case prior to the creation of the RAF in April 1918.22 
It was believed that through the continued existence of the RAF both the army and Royal 
Navy would be placed at major disadvantage in a future war by not being able to control both 
the nature and the timing of any air support they would require. This argument over the 
control of air resources, which was particularly vicious between the army and RAF after the 
Battle of France, would continue through the Second World War until the creation of 2nd 
Tactical Air Force in 1943.23  
The dispute between the RAF and army over tactical air power began in 1921 the Chief of 
Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson argued: 
Mr Balfour’s … suggestion that unless the Royal Air Force be kept completely 
separate and independent of the Army and the Navy we shall be at a serious 
disadvantage compared with foreign nations I am quite unable to understand. 
Neither France, America nor Japan, to quote only the greatest Naval and Military 
powers, have adopted such a policy …24  
The Air Staff’s response was that the structure of British defence resources should ‘conform 
to the requirements of British imperial strategy, not to the methods adopted by Foreign 
Powers whose circumstances are entirely different to our own’.25 This brief episode 
highlights the difficult relations that existed between the RAF and army during the inter-war 
period, and this led to reluctance from both Services at the high command level to engage in 
reasonable debate in how best to train and develop tactical air power in an efficient and 
effective manner.  
Relations between the RAF and army were further hampered by the fact that the status of the 
RAF in Britain was slowly increasing, particularly within Cabinet, who saw the use of the 
RAF as a convenient method to retain control of the Empire whilst reducing the cost burden. 
This use of the RAF helped to cement its status as an independent Service, much to the 
consternation of its sister Services. This was exacerbated with the publication of the Air 
Staff’s first doctrinal publication Confidential Document (CD) 22 in 1922, which emphasised 
the independent use of air power. Despite stating that the RAF would work with the army in 
‘a spirit of generous co-operation’, there was much ambiguity within the chapter on co-
operation with the army. CD 22 stated that the air force commander would act as adviser to 
the military commander; however, it also stated that the military commander would decide 
the work he wanted accomplished and leave the details of how the air force would conduct its 
role to the RAF commander.26 The fundamental issue that continued to plague co-operation 
between the RAF and army in the inter-war period was operational ownership of assets. This 
would then have an overwhelming bearing on how they would be deployed in support of 
ground forces. This viewpoint was confirmed in the War Office’s 1938 publication The 
Employment of Air Forces with the Army in the Field. The fundamental principles of air 
power, which had been codified in 1919 stated that operational control of air resources should 
be under a single air force Commander.27 The War Office’s pamphlet stated that air forces 
should be under the control of a land commander.28 The air officer’s role would be providing 
advice on the availability of air resources, and the general air situation. The air officer would 
then be responsible for putting the land commander’s plan into effect.29 
 This confusion over what the army was to expect in its relationship with the RAF led to 
increasing frustration within the General Staff. It was not the case that the army knew what 
they wanted in terms of equipment or doctrine as they saw air support simply acting as flying 
artillery and operating at the tactical level. In their theoretical thinking they demonstrated an 
ability to conceive of the operational level effects that the fight for air superiority may bring. 
This is demonstrated in The Employment of Air Forces with the Army in the Field, which 
stated:  
In connection with the operations of an army in the field air superiority implies 
the ability to ensure firstly that one’s own reconnaissance and bomber aircraft can 
carry out their tasks effectively, and secondly that the army suffers the minimum 
of interference from the reconnaissance and attacks of enemy aircraft. … Where 
conditions are favourable, a temporary advantage in the struggle for air 
superiority may be obtained by effectively attacking enemy aerodromes.30 
Through gaining control of the air, even at a localised level, the abilities of land forces would 
be enhanced to a greater degree allowing freedom of movement and an ability to project force 
from land-based weapons systems on a larger and more effective scale. If the army was 
willing to accept and publish the ideas of the RAF in operational pamphlets published in 
1925, the RAF must have believed that, at least to a certain degree, they had been able to 
convince the army of at least some of the fundamental principles of air power.31  
 Whether the ideas contained in the doctrinal pamphlet quoted above were simply repeated 
from RAF doctrinal publications in order to demonstrate a superficial degree of co-operation 
on the army’s part is very much open to debate. Given the potentially deliberate lack of 
understanding of air power concepts by the investigatory committee into the Battle of France, 
1940 this explanation is highly convincing. It is possible that the committee, headed by 
General Sir William Bartholomew whose views on the independence of the RAF were well 
known in both Services, was fully aware of air power definitions and chose to deliberately 
misinterpret them in order to shift the blame for the failures on the operations in France in 
1940 away from the army and on to the RAF, and that this had been occurring for several 
years prior to 1940. These misinterpretations, and Bartholomew’s views on an independent 
RAF, will be explored in more depth below when the War Office’s investigation is analysed 
in greater depth. This may also explain why there was so little debate surrounding tactical air 
power development between the RAF and army during the inter-war period. 
In 1923 this confusion and frustration continued as relations with the French government 
reached their lowest ebb over French actions in the Ruhr and attempting to uphold the Treaty 
of Versailles.32 There was a great fear that any potential armed conflict that emerged from 
these tensions would be fought mainly in the air and against civilian populations rather than 
armed forces. London was perceived as being particularly vulnerable to a knock-out blow 
from the air due its proximity to the British south-east coast, and therefore French air bases. 
In an attempt to protect its capital, and despite the financial restrictions that had been placed 
on defence spending, plans were drawn up to spend relatively large sums of money on an air 
expansion programme that would enlarge the Metropolitan Air Force by fifty-two 
squadrons.33 This move by the Lloyd George government caused great resentment within the 
War Office. This was further exacerbated when, again in an attempt to save money, the RAF 
received more responsibility for policing rebellious parts of the Empire. At times, this was in 
place of army garrisons and at others working in close co-operation with them.34 To the War 
Office, however, this was a clear indication of the army’s traditional role being usurped by 
this new Service, which increased tensions between the two. This tension did not, however, 
prevent the two Services conducting joint exercises during the inter-war period. 
Moreover, much good theoretical work was done at brigade and division levels to advance 
the development of tactical air power in Britain, as will be demonstrated below. The army 
claimed that during a joint Staff exercise, conducted in 1923, there had been a great deal of 
ignorance of army co-operation matters from the RAF. A joint conference was held to 
investigate and resolve these issues. This meeting determined that a certain number of RAF 
officers should undertake education at various army schools such as the School of Artillery 
and this should continue on a regular basis. It also stated that officers trained in army co-
operation should be assigned to army co-operation squadrons and that a system was being 
implemented in order to ensure that this occurred.35 Joint courses were also held at the School 
of Army Co-operation at Old Sarum.36 The War Office claimed that the RAF did not regard 
army co-operation tasks as a ‘specialised branch of Air Force work’, as they believed it 
should be.37 In an effort to demonstrate how seriously they took army co-operation work and 
its development within Britain, the RAF were at pains to highlight the efforts they were 
making to ‘train all young officers in the Air Force regarding the formation and organisations 
of the sister services whether or not the duties of co-operation will fall to these officers’.38 
Whilst these were honest efforts to give officers a rounded education with regards the 
different applications on air power, it was very much the case that the focus was on the 
strategic rather than tactical aspects.39 This gave the RAF a political smokescreen that they 
could hide behind when the development of officers trained in tactical air power was 
discussed. There was also the opportunity for further specialised education in tactical air 
power for those who opted or were assigned to this branch through the School of Army Co-
operation at Old Sarum.40 What the RAF failed to point out during this conference was just 
how few officers were being assigned to co-operation work in comparison to those involved 
in the development of strategic air power, the limited number of army co-operation squadrons 
within the RAF’s structure, or how low on the list of priorities tactical air power actually was. 
Due to the global strategic situation of the early 1920s, the funding available to the RAF at 
this time was severely limited and any increase in funding had to be put to its major 
priorities: home defence and strategic bombing.41 Whilst there are no actual lists or statistics 
to support this claim, that the RAF’s focus during the inter-war period was on the application 
of air power at the strategic level cannot be denied. The RAF’s focus at this time was on the 
development of a coherent theory of strategic bombing as this, combined with Imperial 
Policing, and gave it the greatest chance of survival as an independent force.42 This explains 
why the RAF did not want to specify the work being done to develop tactical air power or the 
number of staff assigned to it. 
This cover, however, was not enough to prevent the RAF from receiving a great degree of 
criticism in 1923 and meant that, for appearances sake, they would have to at least appear to 
be taking the development of tactical air power more seriously. This would smooth relations 
between senior commanders, giving the RAF the opportunity to establish itself and its 
intellectual principles. The RAF felt that at this point in their existence, they could not 
prioritise the development of tactical air power too seriously but had to appease their sister 
Services.43  
The financial resources dedicated to the RAF in general also hampered the overall 
development of tactical air power and the relations between the two Services. The army 
requested the attachment of two squadrons to Aldershot Command for training purposes, in 
1923. This request was flatly denied by the RAF on the grounds that these squadrons would 
not be available until after 1925 and only if the RAF expansion scheme proposed in 1923 was 
fully implemented. This expansion scheme was designed to create an additional fifty 
squadrons for the purpose of home defence.44 This expansion would cost £2 million per 
annum in upkeep. Whilst this represented good value for money when compared to the other 
Services, it was still an expense that could not be justified and was ultimately not completed. 
The RAF also highlighted that there existed a specialist school within its own structure 
focused on the training of officers involved in army co-operation. This claim was, however, 
somewhat misleading as many of the officers who passed through this school were not then 
assigned to army co-operation squadrons, thereby not utilising the specialist skills and 
knowledge that had been acquired.45 Still, they were building a critical mass of 
knowledgeable personnel who could build upon the theoretical developments when 
necessary.  
At a further conference with the army in February 1923, the RAF went on to the offensive in 
an attempt to try and settle the issue once and for all. They highlighted the difficulties that 
presented themselves due to the strategic vacuum that all three Services were operating in 
since the end of the First World War. These strategic difficulties were compounded by the 
lack of public money available to the First World War due to a focus on social programmes, 
and the general public revulsion to war and spending on military Services. 
What war are the General Staff and the Air Staff going to train for? How can that 
training be co-ordinated so as to be able to meet any war that we have to consider 
as probable … If it is decided that the war is in the nature of a European war, 
what broadly speaking, are the views of the Staff as to how that war would 
develop?46   
The RAF had highlighted a fundamental issue that would plague the development of tactical 
air power throughout the majority of the inter-war period. In order to develop a functioning 
and effective air support capability, both the RAF and army had to have full knowledge of the 
type of war that was being planned, where in the world it would be fought and to what extent, 
if at all, ground forces would be involved. A conflict that took place within the British 
Empire, for example, may require little in the way of ground troops, leaving the bulk of the 
fighting to be conducted from the air. This was the case when many Imperial Policing 
operations were conducted. If a major conflict was to be fought in Europe against opponents 
that were stronger than those to be found in the Empire, then the nature of the fighting was 
more important. If it was to be a similar war to that of the First World War, then army co-
operation and tactical air power would have to prioritise the gaining of reconnaissance and 
intelligence information as well roles such as artillery spotting over that of direct and 
indirect support of troops during operations.47 This kind of knowledge was simply not 
available to either Service but did prevent, to a degree, tactical air power development in 
Britain, and actively prevented any real contingency planning in this regard. Whilst no nation 
can ever know where its next conflict will be fought, Britain’s position after the First World 
War, with increased imperial responsibilities, meant that this strategic situation became even 
more of a challenge for the Services.  If an air support capability was created and designed to 
be used in a war between imperial powers in a dispute over colonised territory its effect 
would be lessened if the war took place between first-rate European powers on continental 
Europe. 
The development of tactical air power in Britain in the inter-war period took place within the 
wider context of the RAF’s thinking about the application of air power at all levels of war. 
This thinking was first codified in the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air 
Operations, published in 1925. This Manual emphasised the need to gain air superiority over 
the zone of operations before any other air mission could be conducted with a real chance of 
success or influence on the operations of ground forces.48 The Manual, however, was willing 
to concede one point. It was stated that, although the gaining of air superiority was the initial 
primary mission of the whole RAF, any squadron subordinated to an army commander could 
not be used for this task. If we look at the ideas contained within The Employment of Air 
Forces with the Army in the Field in 1938, we can see that, as all air resources aside from an 
advanced striking force for strategic bombing were, in the army’s opinion, to be placed under 
the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, there would be no aircraft available for 
missions such as air superiority.49 The RAF were willing to concede this point due to the 
arguments that had taken place in 1923 and further iterated in their Manual of 1925, 
highlighting their dedication to air support training and development, and would not have 
been aware of the army’s policy to have all air resources of an air component under the 
control of the Commander-in-Chief. This allocation of resources would, however, have had 
profound implications for the RAF as they continued in their deep-battlefield-centric focus. 
The British Army simply wanted a force to act as flying artillery under their control, the 
RAF’s focus was on attacking targets beyond the front-lines (and beyond the perspective of 
army commanders). This job would have been made almost impossible without the gaining 
and maintaining of air superiority to allow the RAF to dominate the skies. They did this in 
order to demonstrate to the army that they were taking this aspect of air power as seriously as 
others. Whilst the RAF may be accused of over-exaggerating how seriously they took the 
development of tactical air power in the inter-war period, they did in fact look to build a base 
level of knowledge and understanding of its basic principles both at that time and for the 
future. 
This speaks to the pressure they felt as the army and Royal Navy pushed to have the RAF 
disbanded. The 1925 Manual also emphasised what the army co-operation exercises would 
highlight in later years in order to maximise the efficiency of air support: ‘It is only by the 
closest liaison between the staffs of the three commanders that the RAF units can be used to 
the best advantage and with a minimum of interference and wasted effort’.50 Through the co-
location of headquarters mistakes in communication could be avoided and both Services 
would fully understand what the overall military plan was and how their forces could best 
achieve this. 
The RAF’s next major doctrinal manual, their War Manual, was published in 1928. This War 
Manual again dealt with co-operation matters through an entire chapter (fourteen pages out of 
a total of 168) dedicated to the subject. Whilst this is not a substantial part of the overall War 
Manual, it did set out the fundamental concepts that were required from the aerial point of 
view for successful integration with land forces. The RAF were at pains to point out the 
importance of the gaining and maintaining of air superiority over the battlefield and the 
subsequent denial of aerial freedom to the enemy.51 With the pressure on the RAF being 
lifted, and its existence almost guaranteed through the failures of the army and Royal Navy to 
have it disbanded, the RAF was now in a position where it could develop its thoughts on air 
support with greater freedom. This was demonstrated by the fact that they emphasised the use 
of aircraft in an interdiction role, particularly attacking targets that were outside of the range 
of the army’s artillery. The Manual did, however, concede that aircraft may have to be used 
to act in a close support role during an emergency. To conduct this role effectively, the 
Manual recommended that fast single-seater fighters be utilised.52 Two-seater fighters, still 
widespread within the RAF at this time, should only be diverted from their normal work if 
the target was of supreme importance. The Manual, however, did not specify what type of 
targets could be classed as being of supreme importance or what constituted an emergency. 
This meant that RAF commanders had almost carte blanche to refuse to attack almost any 
target. In their War Manual, the RAF looked to highlight what they perceived to be the most 
important aspect of tactical air power: battlefield air interdiction. The disagreement over the 
correct use of air power to support land forces from the air was the major cause of tension 
between the RAF and the army, throughout this period. The RAF held firm in their belief that 
close air support was an overly dangerous mission that should not be utilised in the normal 
course of events. Their method of demonstrating this will be explored in more detail 
below. Battlefield air interdiction also offered operational levels advantages to ground forces, 
but its effect was not immediate and could rarely be seen by troops on the ground. 
The final doctrinal publication of the RAF prior to the Second World War was the second 
edition of the Manual of Army Co-operation in 1937. One area that the Manual focused upon 
was the composition of the air component that would accompany any expeditionary force.53 
Despite the increasing tensions in Europe at this time, British foreign and defence policy was 
based on ‘Limited Liability’. This policy took for granted the idea that French forces would 
undertake the majority of the fighting on land, whilst the British utilised their superior naval 
and air power capabilities. ‘Limited Liability’ allowed the British to continue to develop a 
strategic air force to act as a deterrent to warfare whilst not risking their general security in 
Europe through the diplomatic moves that formed part of the policy of appeasement.54 The 
investment in and creation and development of an expeditionary force capable of fighting 
effectively on the continent against a first-class enemy was relegated to the bottom of the list 
of priorities.55 The priorities for the defence establishment in Britain were the defence of 
Britain from the air and the undertaking of strategic air attacks against a potential enemy, the 
maintenance of Britain’s naval position around the globe and, finally, the support of allies in 
the field on continental Europe.56 There would be a small, limited, BEF that would receive 
the majority of its air support from the French Armée de l’Air. This meant that the RAF 
would be able to focus on strategic attacks against the German homeland, with a component 
stationed on French soil in order to conduct further strategic attacks. The policy of ‘Limited 
Liability’ was subsequently replaced with one that sent a bigger expeditionary force to the 
continent. This decision, however, was not made until early 1939 and required a larger air 
component to support it.57 This meant that RAF had little time to alter the production 
priorities that had begun since the start of rearmament in 1934 and increased greatly in 
1936.58 There was also little time to overhaul their thinking about air support and adapt it to a 
major conflagration against a first-class, well-equipped nation on the continent.59  
The Manual went into detail about the communication procedures and how aircraft were to be 
used in the approach phase of operations, as well as working with a mobile force. In order to 
allow an air component freedom of action, as well as covering all of the potential roles they 
could be called on to conduct, the Manual detailed different types of operation in many 
different theatres. The Manual stated that in order to provide squadron and military 
commanders with the necessary intelligence to conduct operations effectively, Air Liaison 
Officers would work closely with both Services. They would also provide army co-operation 
squadrons with up-to-date details about artillery arrangements and provide direction to 
aircraft in the air as to the changing situation on the ground or new information gained from 
reconnaissance patrols.60 This demonstrated a great deal of development from the start of the 
inter-war period. This development was not just in the theoretical ideas, and necessary staff, 
required to provide the army co-operation squadrons with the information on the ground that 
was required as the battlefield became more complex. It also required developments in 
technology to allow the necessary two-way communication. This was achieved through the 
reduction in the size of radio equipment and the ability to communicate orally rather than 
through wireless telegraphy. Prior to the introduction of two-way radio pilots conducting air 
support missions would have to be briefed on the ground with as much detail as possible. 
This reduced the ability of squadrons to react to situations on the ground and attack fleeting 
opportunity targets.61 Two-way radio allowed both squadrons and individual pilots to be 
briefed to attack more than one target and they would be able to receive more updates as to 
the potentially fluid situation below them, allowing tactical decisions to be made whilst in the 
air. 
The developments in tactical air power that did take place emerged from inter-Brigade and 
inter-Division exercises that explored the theoretical problems associated with supporting 
ground forces in the field. These exercises could, however, only go so far and the doctrinal 
ideas that emerged would have to be revised in the light of the operational experience gained 
fighting in the Second World War. Exercises could not replicate the strain and confusion 
present in operations against an active enemy and any doctrine or systems developed would 
be placed under far greater pressure. The results of the exercises were published annually at 
the end of each training year and the ideas and conclusions that emerged were combined with 
other ideas and codified into operational instructions and doctrine manuals such as the Royal 
Air Force Manual of Army Co-operation (AP1176) and the Royal Air Force War Manual 
Part One – Operations (AP1300).62 These Manuals were published in 1937 and 1928 
respectively. Many of the lessons to improve the RAF’s air support concerned the command 
and organisation of air forces rather than any developments in tactics. The major issues 
involved in utilising tactical air support in the field lay in the co-operation of headquarters to 
work in unison in the attainment of the overall military objective, communication of targets 
to forward airfields and in what situation aircraft could best be utilised to support ground 
troops. The 1927 Army Co-operation Report advised RAF commanders who were 
responsible for co-operating with the army to ‘point out to commanders of formations under 
whose orders they are working the importance of their selecting their headquarters in relation 
to possible landing grounds’. In terms of working with ground forces, the report stated that 
the commanders should keep in the closest touch with the formations with which they are co-
operating in order to know fully the requirements of those formations. The report, however, 
had little to say on the location of air headquarters or whether they were better placed near 
landing grounds or army formation headquarters.63 
The problem of having to issue separate orders to both air and ground formations also formed 
part of the 1927 report. During the exercises, orders were issued to squadrons that were based 
on orders issued by the army commander. Much time was lost re-writing and then issuing the 
separate air force order meaning that air support was delayed and therefore not as effective as 
it could have been, particularly if orders were late arriving from the army commander. It was 
from this that the importance of co-located air and ground headquarters was discerned. This 
had first been noted during the First World War.64 As demonstrated from its frequent 
mentions in army co-operation exercise reports, however, it was something that had been lost 
by both Services. If the army had their way, this would not be an issue as the air force 
commander would be an integral part of the army’s command structure. Similarly, if the RAF 
were able to end any conflict quickly through strategic bombing, there would be little need to 
establish joint headquarters in the field. This meant that both Services, looking at the 
development of tactical air power through their own perspective, could not agree on 
either the best way forward or on a compromise solution. The co-location of headquarters 
was vital to ensure the timely flow of information so that air crews could be briefed 
effectively, and an operational plan drawn up that would allow the RAF to be as effective as 
possible in their support of ground forces. If headquarters were not co-located this would lead 
to delays in the provision of air support. 
In the event of late arrival of army operation orders, it is possible that it may 
prove difficult to issue a squadron operation order in writing early enough before 
operations take place. In such a case it is probable that the RAF commander will 
have attended a meeting at divisional or other headquarters. If this is had 
occurred, he should have received sufficient instruction to enable him to hold a 
conference of his subordinate commanders and to issue verbal orders and 
instructions, supplemented, if necessary, by a table of work for the following 
day.65 
The report also considered the effectiveness of fighter aircraft in army co-operation and the 
conclusion reached was that fighter pilots ‘generally did not understand the principle of 
attacking troops on the ground’. This was attributed to ‘the small amount of practice which 
has been afforded to them’.66 This demonstrates that despite the RAF’s insistence about how 
much effort was being afforded to army co-operation development and training this was, in 
fact, a legitimate complaint from the army. The 1928 report highlighted the high turnover of 
staff within army co-operation squadrons and the difficulties this posed establishing and 
maintaining a stable and growing expertise in this area. It also meant that any training 
conducted outside of the exercises would only ever be of a basic nature as pilots and 
commanders were not able to gain enough experience to allow more advanced training to be 
conducted. The high turnover of staff was due mainly to the status that army co-operation 
squadrons were held in by the RAF as a whole. With the restrictions in manpower caused by 
the limited defence budgets of the late 1920s and early 1930s combined with the RAF 
looking to defend its independent status an army co-operation squadron was not the place an 
ambitious young officer could launch a career.67 Despite high profile officers who theorised 
about tactical air power such as Trafford Leigh-Mallory and John Slessor, they are isolated 
examples that further highlight how army co-operation was viewed within the RAF.  
Slessor was, however, highly influential in the teaching of army co-operation at the army 
staff college at Camberley and the lectures he gave there formed the basis of a book 
published in 1936 entitled Air Power and Armies. This work has been described as ‘a serious 
attempt to instil in army and air officers an understanding of how air power was likely to 
affect the problems of land warfare in the future.’ Air Power and Armies has an interesting 
take on tactical air power. In it, Slessor argues that interdiction of supplies and matériel 
would be of more importance than preventing reserves from influencing the tactical level 
battle. This work expanded further on how the RAF viewed tactical air power at this time and 
demonstrates that there were personnel with serious, senior command level responsibility 
who were thinking about how best to apply it in future warfare. Regular courses on tactical 
air power were also held on a joint Service basis at the Army Co-operation School at Old 
Sarum.68 These courses were different to those that had taken place in the 1920s. As the 
available aircraft technology developed throughout the inter-war period, particularly 
the revolutionary use of all-metal, fixed wing, stressed skin monoplanes in the early 
1930s, the height speed and reach of aircraft increased. This meant that the tactics and 
concepts utilised to provide air support had to be modified and the courses that taught 
the new methods also had to be changed. The courses also took account of the 
developments emerging from the operations being conducted around the Empire. 
These, however, were seen to be of limited use in a potential European war. The major 
change in these army co-operation courses, however, was an increased focus on 
battlefield air interdiction over close air support. This approach was more in line with 
the RAF rather than army’s perspective on air-land integration. It must be borne in mind 
that the commanders mentioned above were already well established within the command 
structure of the RAF during the inter-war period. It was the officers at the lowest level that 
did not see army co-operation squadrons as the place from which to launch a career.69 
The 1928 report also made note of lessons highlighted in the 1927 report with regards to the 
employment of fighter aircraft in a close air support role. Fighters continued to be used 
against ‘unshaken troops’. These were troops that had not come under heavy artillery or 
ground attack and were not vulnerable to close air support aircraft acting in isolation. The 
previous year’s report, along with the 1928 report made it clear how fighter aircraft should be 
used when acting in a supporting capacity. ‘The use of fighter squadrons should … be 
directed towards harassing a retirement or carrying on a pursuit after the exhaustion of the 
pursuing troops. Low flying attacks should never be launched unless information points to the 
existence of a definite and suitable objective …’70 The RAF had an institutional dislike of 
what were then labelled low flying attacks but are now known as close air support. Whilst 
these were the most dangerous of all air support missions for pilots during the First World 
War, the RAF went out of their way to make them appear even more dangerous. This was in 
an effort to prevent the army from requesting them. The RAF even went as far as 
manipulating the figures of casualties from the Battle of Amiens in order to justify this 
position. There were other attacks that utilised close air support that did not suffer 
casualties as great as those at Amiens, yet it was these figures that were utilised by the 
Air Staff to support their case to limit the use of close air support in future conflicts. 
 Alistair McCluskey has argued that  
By misinterpreting the casualty data from low-level attack it would appear that 
the Air Staff were guilty of subjective misuse of the evidence of Amiens which 
created a false perspective of the facts. This may have been inadvertent but in the 
debate over support to the army, the RAF was the clear beneficiary. This also 
contradicts David Hall’s belief that the General Staff were to blame for the 
deterioration in inter-Service relations and the development of tactical air power; 
the Air Staff played an equal role at least.71 
The RAF’s fundamental belief was that close air support should be used in a defensive 
emergency or to exploit a breakthrough.72 In order to achieve this, the RAF would continually 
cite the close air support action during the First World War that had resulted in the most 
casualties to pilots as evidence as to why close air support attacks should be limited as much 
as possible. The RAF were looking to impose their own vision of tactical air power and not to 
simply dismiss it out of hand. This was at odds with how the army viewed the issue, and they 
were quick to lay the blame for defeat in the Battle of France at the RAF’s door for not 
providing the correct form of air support, in the form of a defensive fighter umbrella and 
close air support.73 
The RAF also did not want the army to view close air support as a panacea to any tactical 
difficulties they may experience whilst in the field. What the RAF feared most was that air 
support aircraft would be viewed as flying artillery by the army, despite the potential moral 
effect close support could have on friendly ground forces.74 This was how the army viewed 
tactical air power and saw it operating at the tactical level only. Chapter Three of The 
Employment of Air Forces with the Army in the Field, details how the army expected aircraft 
to be utilised in support of ground forces. It is here that the army’s views on air support 
become clearer.  
The policy for the employment of bomber aircraft to assist an army to achieve its 
object must rest with the military commander; he alone is able to decide, as a 
result of all available information and technical advice, which military objectives, 
if successfully attacked, are likely to cause the most serious dislocation of the 
enemy’s plan.75 
This was the army looking to retain the control of tactical air resources whilst they were 
deployed on active operations and being able to use it against targets that would be of most 
value to them. To the army these targets were those that would be faced by the army in the 
field when in contact with the enemy and could best be attacked through close air support. 
They were unwilling to accept the tactical and operational level gains that could be made 
through the deployment of battlefield air interdiction. The section of the chapter that looks at 
Air Bombing focuses mostly on attacking targets of a tactical nature, that would be most 
useful for troops needing to break through enemy lines. There is a passing reference to 
attacking interdiction targets, but this was superficial in nature and points out the difficulties 
in attacking targets such as railway lines and bridges instead of the gains that can be 
achieved.76  
The difficulties with conducting low flying attacks were brought to a head in the 1934 Army 
Co-operation Report. There had been increasing calls from army commanders for aircraft to 
act as targets for small arms anti-aircraft defence training. In order to prevent aircraft being 
used in this role too often, the RAF imposed certain restrictions, including its use only with 
regular troops. Requests for this form of support were to be kept to a minimum and attacks 
would be confined to straight dives only.77 Whilst the safety of its pilots must have been a 
concern to the RAF, and indeed was cited as the major reason to limit this form of training, 
there were greater concerns for the RAF in terms of army co-operation training. The Air Staff 
feared that by becoming overly proficient in army co-operation missions, there was a very 
real danger that they would be expected to conduct these operations over independent 
strategic missions.78 This again was a form of self-protection from the RAF. Through 
focusing on becoming overly competent at missions such as low flying attack, they would 
face increased demands, and not be able to dedicate the necessary resources to strategic roles. 
The inter-war exercises, they felt, would allow them to be competent enough without 
becoming a burden, as they were advancing the RAF’s understanding of what was required in 
terms of a theoretical underpinning.  Despite the intellectual work being put in to developing 
effective tactics in attacking specific targets there were still major fundamental issues that 
had to be resolved that continued to emerge from the army co-operation exercises of the 
inter-war period. 
The high turnover of army co-operation pilots and commanders had still not been resolved by 
1929 and the status of army co-operation within the RAF was made even more clear when the 
following statement was written: 
It is most essential that sufficient attention should be devoted to purely RAF 
training. Requests from the army for demonstrations or co-operation with 
formations smaller than a brigade should be carefully reviewed.79 
This statement was made by an RAF that had a renewed self-confidence as it believed that it 
had survived the worst of the army and Royal Navy’s attempts to have it disbanded and it 
could now start to fully develop its thinking behind how the next war would be fought in the 
air. 
The report issued in the wake of the 1930 exercises highlighted an issue that caused great 
consternation and difficulties during the Second World War. This was the location of ground 
and air headquarters and the relative distance between the two. The report stated that ‘… it 
should be an established principle that where possible, corps and, possibly, divisional 
commanders should site their headquarters in close proximity to land suitable for the 
squadron aerodrome’.80 That this principle had to be re-learned and re-iterated on several 
occasions well into the Second World War, such as during the Battle of France and in the 
Western Desert, does call into question how well, and how widely, these training reports 
were read and assimilated into learned doctrine. This is particularly the case with regard the 
army and the interest that was being shown in these publications particularly in places such as 
staff colleges where the officers who would be implementing this doctrine were being 
trained. The notion that these army co-operation reports were not acted upon is supported by 
the fact that the same point about co-location was made in the 1931 report:  
The following notes with regards to the use and nature of advanced landing 
grounds are issued for guidance: - 
(i) Squadron aerodromes should usually be located near corps’ headquarters 
and should move with it. 
(ii) The ideal situation for such an advanced landing ground is within a mile 
or so of the divisional headquarters …81 
It appears, from the available evidence, that the army was willing to publish some of the ideas 
that emerged from the inter-war exercises into their own operational pamphlets, but these 
ideas were not necessarily implemented when the BEF took the field in 1939.82  
The inter-service arguments were still very much over the operational control of tactical air 
resources and the correct way to apply air power at the tactical level. This does not, however, 
detract from the ideas that emerged during the inter-war period or the work that went into 
developing them and the guidance they gave to those looking to further develop the RAF’s 
tactical air support capabilities during the Second World War. The fact that the army were 
willing to use some of the ideas and principles that had been developed in the inter-Brigade 
and inter-Division exercises of the early to middle inter-war period demonstrates their 
importance in the development of the theoretical basis for tactical air power in the Second 
World War. This acceptance by the army highlights that they had, at the very least, accepted 
the RAF’s ideas with regard to the basic framework and processes required to enable 
effective air support to be provided.  
When the BEF and the RAF’s supporting components left for France in late 1939 there was 
still a large chasm in how the RAF and army viewed tactical air power, but the reality of war 
meant that agreements now had to be reached. It also meant that the RAF would go to France 
with an incomplete doctrine that would require a great deal of improvisation from both 
individual pilots and lower level commanders to be successful.83 The improvisation that 
emerged from the Battle of France 1940 will be subject to greater analysis below. Despite 
these advancements in the white heat of active operations, the strategic and operational nature 
of the fighting meant that there was very little impact the RAF could have on the overall 
result of the Battle of France.  
The failings that led to defeat in that campaign were of operational and strategic level 
thinking, operational speed and mobility and speed of communication.84 The basis of the 
agreed doctrine of 1939 was very much based on the lessons and experience of the First 
World War and the army co-operation exercises of the inter-war period. There were, 
however, many areas of air support, identified by both Services, that required further 
development. 
The most important of these was the communications system that was to be used by ground 
forces when calling for air support from bomber squadrons that were based in Britain on an 
unplanned impromptu basis. It was noted that these communications links may have been 
unreliable under the stresses of war as ‘some [of the] liaison links …[would] have to 
communicate over large distances’.85 Despite these potential problems, the War Office were 
happy to agree to this communications system as it was ‘the best expedient under [the] 
present system of control of bomber aircraft’.86 The War Office detailed the targets that 
would take priority during operations in France. These priorities were the delay of leading 
armoured formations, the disorganisation of the movements of reinforcements for the enemy 
armoured and motorised columns and the interference with mobilization arrangements. These 
target priorities were of an interdictory nature. This was because it could be easily planned 
prior to the start of operations whereas close support attacks would rely on a daily assessment 
of the tactical situation on the ground once operations had begun. It is still noteworthy, 
however, that the War Office had agreed in principle to the RAF’s view of tactical air power 
rather than the ideas they had propagated throughout the inter-war period. The conclusions 
and criticisms made in the Bartholomew Report, the investigation conducted by the War 
Office in the wake of the Battle of France must be understood within this context.87 
Despite the agreements reached between the two Services in 1939, more changes were made 
to the organisation of the RAF Component of the BEF and the RAF’s strategic striking 
formation the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF). Both of these forces were to be 
commanded by senior RAF officers much to the disappointment of the army who felt that 
these forces should have been placed under their operational control. The RAF’s reasoning 
against this was that it broke one of the fundamental principles that had been codified by the 
then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Sir Hugh Trenchard and the newly formed Air Staff in 
1919. This principle was that all air forces should be under the operational control of an air 
force commander.88  The AASF was headquartered and based at Reims as this would allow it 
to attack targets deep inside Germany.89 There is evidence, however, that as early as 
September 1939 plans were being made to utilise the AASF in an air support capacity 
providing assistance for a French offensive that was planned to take place in the Saar 
region.90 The CAS at the time, Sir Cyril Newall, was against agreeing to this idea whilst 
active operations were not being undertaken by the French but the fact that they were willing 
to consider this demonstrates a flexibility that had not been apparent during the inter-war 
period. This flexibility extended to the Chiefs of Staff who felt that the AASF would be  
… suitable for undertaking operations against the enemy’s Army, including 
communications and installations in its immediate rear. This part of the Striking 
Force [is] suitable therefore, for undertaking that direct action against the 
advancing German Army which is advocated by General Gamelin …91 
Despite being at war and having forces stationed in France the army still continued in their 
attempts to gain operational control of the RAF’s tactical air support capabilities. Their 
reasoning behind this lay in a misreading of German military organisation and structure after 
the fighting in Poland.92 In order to counter these moves by the War Office the Secretary of 
State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, stated that the ‘Air Ministry are arranging for a proportion 
of the bomber forces to receive special training with the Army’.93 Once operations had begun 
in France it became obvious to all involved that the slow obsolescent aircraft, such as the 
Fairey Battle, that made up the AASF would not be able to conduct a strategic striking role 
against Germany, and ‘there was very little doubt that their main employment could be 
tactical’.94  
The RAF Component of the BEF was the force that was primarily designed to give British 
ground forces all the support they would require in the field. The force was originally placed 
under the command of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, General Lord Gort. The 
senior RAF officer appointed to the Air Component was Air Vice-Marshal C.H.R. Blount.95 
This command situation was changed with the creation of British Air Forces in France when 
all RAF tactical resources were placed under the command of Air Marshal Sir Arthur ‘Ugly’ 
Barratt.96 The limitations of the Air Component had been recognised by the fact that, whilst 
in theory it should be able to provide all the support required, if further support was required 
a request was to be made through War Office in London who would then pass this on to the 
Air Ministry who would either approve or deny the request. If the request was approved, it 
was the Air Ministry’s responsibility to pass the orders on to the commanders of the AASF. 
The War Office believed this system for additional support to be ‘dangerously inadequate 
both in resources and organization’.97  
With mounting criticism of the communications arrangement in place in France the RAF 
demonstrated a degree of proactivity in overhauling the organisation and command structure 
of the RAF in France. These changes were based on the theoretical underpinning of the 
experience of the inter-war army co-operation exercises and were adapted to suit the specific 
operational environment of France. That changes were made to the system is not unusual as 
the basic system developed was adapted according to the varying operational conditions of 
the various theatres in which the RAF operated during the Second World War. The demand 
for change was not limited to just the army. Barratt, who had been Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief (AOC-in-C) No.1 Mission, RAF, was fully aware of the potential weaknesses, not 
only of the communications structure, but of the command and control system as a whole. 
The AOC-in-C Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, was of the 
opinion that a new headquarters formation was required in France in order ‘to button up the 
divergent or convergent requirements of the French and British forces, the Air Component, 
the AASF and Bomber Command’.98 This new command and headquarters organisation 
would be responsible for all air support conducted in France, including the operations of the 
AASF and would provide this support to any part of the Allied front, not just the British 
sector as had been the case previously.99 Barratt’s position as commander was described as 
being ‘similar to that of the C-in-C, BEF, except that he will not be under any French 
Commander’.100 These changes were necessary to remove some of the complexities that had 
been found in the original systems whilst stationed in France and to allow the system to 
operate more effectively when required.  
Despite the creation of BAFF, the communications system utilised by the RAF remained 
complex and the role of the AASF within this new organisation was still less than clear as it 
could be utilised to conduct either a tactical or strategic role. If it was to be used in a strategic 
role in conjunction with Bomber Command, the command of the force would pass to the 
AOC-in-C Bomber Command. In this scenario, operational orders would be issued directly to 
the AOC, AASF by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the sanction of the War Cabinet.101 
This still represented a highly complex communications system even with the removal of one 
link that had previously existed where orders would be passed from Bomber Command to the 
AASF.102 It would also still place a huge strain on the wired and wireless communications 
systems available to the RAF. This command structure was a move away from the ideas that 
had emerged from the inter-war army co-operation exercises such as the co-location of 
headquarters. This can be attributed to the fact that the RAF saw its aerodromes in France as 
bases from which it could conduct attacks against the German homeland and so saw little 
need in focusing all its forces on support of the BEF. Despite the work that had been 
undertaken in the inter-war period demonstrating the importance of co-located headquarters, 
that this was not followed should not cast a shadow on the efforts to highlight its importance. 
In fact, the importance of co-located headquarters was something that had to be learnt the 
hard way in the Western Desert and has had to be subsequently re-learnt on several occasions 
in major operations.103 
Another area that was transformed by BAFF was the close support communications system 
that was to be utilised by ground forces when in close contact with the enemy. It would also 
provide the theoretical and intellectual basis for further development later in the Second 
World War.104 The communication headquarters was called the Allied Central Air Bureau 
(ACAB). When it was first created, the ACAB was simply a signals headquarters that was 
‘built on a series of landlines with ciphered Wireless [Telegraphy] back up’.105 The function 
of the ACAB was split up into three separate and distinct areas. The first was the sorting of 
the information that was received from air reconnaissance. Using this information, it would 
then request further reconnaissance of areas of importance and allotting bombing tasks based 
on the information received.106 The ACAB was also ‘entrusted with the task not only of 
maintaining close liaison with General d’Astier, commander of the Zone des Operations 
Aeriennes du Nord, on all points which concerned the two Air Forces in his Zone, but also of 
studying the whole problem of air action in the event of operations in Belgium and Holland; 
the plans for which were being prepared by the French High Command’.107 The ACAB 
further developed and used to great effect another organisation that had been created whilst 
the RAF was in France. This was ‘Phantom’, a specialised ground reconnaissance unit, 
composed of a joint army/air unit.108  
Gort was initially apprehensive and critical of the ACAB and highlighted an issue that would 
cause real problems for the RAF when they looked to conduct impromptu air support 
missions. This was the potential time delay that could occur between a request for support 
being received and the attack being conducted. 
Last week the board carried out a two-day practice scheme which worked pretty 
well, but it brought out the delays which now occur between a reconnaissance 
aircraft sighting a suitable target and the bombers leaving the ground to engage it, 
delays which leaves much to be overcome.109 
Such a joint communications headquarters came straight from the ideas that had been trialled 
and tested during the inter-war period. When writing his despatches after the fighting in 
France, Gort’s opinion of the ACAB had changed dramatically. ‘The development of the 
ACAB and of its communication to the headquarters of higher formations in France and to 
the Royal Air Force at home, was likewise to prove its worth in the days to come as an 
organisation for co-ordinating information and requests for air action’.110  
Despite a relative lack of attention between 1919 and 1939, much good theoretical work was 
done to advance tactical air power. Amongst the ideas that emerged and would be utilised to 
great effect during the Second World War, was the importance of the co-location of 
headquarters, effective communications systems between squadrons and the placement of 
RAF staff officers at army divisional headquarters. During the inter-war period, the 
development of tactical air power in Britain was subject to little debate, a great deal of 
discussion and a lot of disagreement between the RAF and army. That knowledge gained 
during the inter-war period was not employed in the Battle of France by Britain was due to 
several reasons. British forces were under the strategic control of the French High Command 
and so were restricted in how they were able to deploy and operate; the French 
communication system did not lend itself to the methods of control suggested in the inter-war 
army co-operation exercises; and the Allies found themselves on the back foot from the 
beginning of the campaign and so were unable to act as they would have wished as they were 
always reactive rather than proactive. It also required a level of co-operation between the 
RAF and army that was simply impossible at this time, and ideas such as co-located 
headquarters could not be implemented. The RAF felt their independence to be under threat 
of the acceded to the army’s requests, and with the settling of the independent status of the 
RAF, the army never truly believed it would gain operational control over sufficient air 
resources to justify developing its thinking to any great extent. This, combined with a 
continental role being at the bottom of its list of priorities meant that the army could use the 
development of tactical air power as a political rather than operational weapon.111 The army 
saw the relative lack of tactical air power as a means to place the burgeoning RAF 
under an immense amount of inter-Service political pressure and to push for what they 
saw as the correct conduct of war at the tactical rather than the operational level. The 
army did not know how it would utilise close air support in the event of a major 
European war but did ‘know’ that it would only be effective for them as an organisation 
if it was focused at the tactical level. It was this political battle that was fought by the 
army and RAF in the inter-war period rather than one over how air support would be 
utilised in any major future war. This speaks further to an issue that continues to 
plague tactical air power to this day: the different perspectives of air and land 
commanders. The air commander is concerned not only with the front line but what is 
beyond it, within the range of the aircraft deployed. The land commander is concerned 
only with what can be seen up to the front line and a limited distance beyond this. As 
this article has demonstrated, the argument that the RAF simply forgot how to support the 
army in Britain during the inter-war period is incorrect. It would, however, be correct to 
argue that it was not a priority for either the RAF or the army at this time and its greater and 
further development suffered as a result. This meant that British forces in 1939 went to 
France with an incomplete doctrine. It did, however, provide the intellectual basis for further 
development during the Second World War under the auspices of Army Co-operation 
Command and the Western Desert Air Force. 
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